Summary of Meeting Paper

The 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis-Europe

Integrated Knowledge of Organisation Influence on Plant Safety. M. Abramovici, GRID, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, France

Introduction

The analysis of accidents such as TMI [1] or Challenger [2] has shown that root causes can often be traced to the role of organisation. However the organisation is not taken into account as such in most Probabilistic Risk Assessments. One reason for that situation can be found in the difficulty in defining "organisation" clearly. There is no single model of the organisation which can give a correct description of the reality and in particular allow an exhaustive prediction of the interactions between the technical system and the human and organisational systems.

This problem is not particular to the study of organisational reliability. The need for a better model is real in every attempt to perform a priori assessment. To make up for gaps in knowledge, Risk Analysis has developed complementary use of a posteriori and a priori assessment [3]. Accident analysis, for instance, can bring to light causal links between initiating events and the malfunction observed. Such links are incorporable into a Probabilistic Risk Analysis based on a systematic consideration of possible sequences of events and their consequences. The determinist nature of the relation examined allows the integration of new information, learned from past experiences, in PRA.

Such determinist relations cannot be observed when studying organisation or human reliability. Hollnagel has shown that the assumptions used in the "engineering solution" cannot be applied to the field of human reliability analysis [4].

Shall we give up incorporating organisational factors into risk analysis?

We will argue that there are alternatives for integrating knowledge of organisational influence into Risk Analysis. We will first analyze what model of organisation can support accident assessment. Then we will review two methods of PRA which allow incorporation of organisational knowledge from past experience.

I- ORGANISATION IN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

We propose to call "organisational factors", every factor taken into account in the accident analysis, that is indirectly linked to the working of the technical system. This definition allows us an easy distinction between human and organisational factors.

The problem is then to understand why such factors are incorporated into the incident's analysis whereas the mark of malfunction is purely technical. Studying an example allows us to build a model of organisation which supports a posteriori assessment.

Figure : The three levels model of Organisation

This model [ see figure ] links organisational and human activity levels together. It precisely defines the role of operators and their limits.

We call "means of intervention", the whole set of possible human actions on the technical system. The set of "means of intervention " is limited in theory, but can be very great because each procedure is defined in relation to a state of the technical system.

We call "principles of intervention", the whole set of possible ways for the organisation to influence human actions. These can be instructions given to the operators, but also schedule constraints or inspection and maintenance procedures.

Such an analysis is consistent with the Taylorian model of organisation, which separates conception and execution tasks [5,6]. When the part taken by human activity in the system is delimited by the organisation, a third level can exist. The implicit postulate of our model is that there is an organisation able to guarantee safe functioning. This creates the possibility to understand why the second level (execution) fails by rising to the organisational level. When studying an accident, the analyst can understand a human error by pointing to the organisational factors in failure. However, there is no determinism between the second and the third level. The organisational factors can help to understand the human error; they are not its direct cause. We call such a link, "influence".

The question is then: How can such indirect influence be integrated in a priori assessment?

II- ORGANISATION IN A PRIORI ASSESSMENT

We have chosen two models of PRA among others (see for example [7,8,9]) which include human and organisational factors.

The model T.H.E.R.P

This model is known as the first Probabilistic method allowing the incorporation of human factors assessment's. In fact, T.H.E.R.P also present a model of organisation through the "Performance Shaping Factors" (PSFs) which allow to consider the factors affecting human performance [10]. Some of these factors are internal and are linked to the human model used. The external PSFs include the entire work environment influence's, which we call "principles of intervention". PSFs are incorporated in quantitative analysis by varying the probabilities of human errors. When studying the process of PSFs identification's, a model of organisation emerges which is very close to our model. The importance of the "administrative control" concept, defined as "the degree to which the plant is run in conformance to the guidelines by which it was designed to run"[10] shows indeed the importance of prescription in the logic used to quantify in T.H.E.R.P. The description of the PSFs and their effects is based on knowledge from past experience, i.e. studies when available or expert judgements.

Even if the method is not rigorous enough to allow good results [4], it can be seen as based on complementary use of a posteriori knowledge and a priori assessment.

The Model SAM

The Systems, Actions, and Management model (SAM) has been proposed by Paté-Cornell (11, 12]. Starting from a PRA of the physical system, it allows us to "identify systematically the human decisions and actions that affect the PRA inputs, and in turn, the organizational and management sources of these human decisions and actions" [12]. Thus, three levels are distinguished, which are similar to those we proposed above. This bottom-up method makes integration of organisational influence knowledge possible. In addition, the same model can be used to understand causalities in the accident scenarios [13]. This model improves the concept of influence and makes possible the integration of such a link in QRA , through Bayesian results. It also introduces techniques, such as influence diagrams, which guarantee complementary between a posteriori and a priori approaches. We will argue that this model is very attractive despite the fact that it does not produce an exhaustive description of organisation.

Conclusion

The theory of probability has been very fruitful in supporting quantitative risk analysis. With the notion of influence, it is possible to integrate knowledge of organisational influence in QRA and enrich the notion of causalities. However, systematic integration of organisational factors in a posteriori assessment, and especially in incident analysis will be required to further advance risk analysis in complex system.

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