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radioactive anomalies with the maximum dose rate up to a few
Röntgen per hour (R · h-1) were detected. Nuclear Legacy of Russia: Aging of Professional Society As One of the Key Components of Risk Management. A F. Nechaev and V. V. Projaev, St. Petersburg Institute of Technology, 26, Moskovsky prospect, St. Petersburg, 198013 Russia
INTRODUCTION
The problem of nuclear legacy in Russia is, undoubtedly, the
most sensitive and the most complicated one in respect of the
issues involved: financing, qualified management, availability of
material resources, proper planning, etc. Apart from everything
else, solution of the problem strongly depends on psychological
climate in public media and adequacy of human resources in
professional sphere. These important aspects are the subject of
present study.
RATIONALE
Radioactive contamination from the past industrial and nuclear activities is one of the most complicated and, to some extend, stiff uncertain problem not only in Russia. Photographic picture of radiation situation could be described as follows [1]:
Ural Region. From 1949 until 1951 liquid
radioactive waste from nuclear weapon plant "Mayak"
(South Ural, near Chelyabinsk) were pumped directly into the
Techa River. The total volume of the waste pumped has been
estimated to be 76 million m3 with total ß-activity
around 1 · 1017 Bq. These discharges have affected
28,000 local residents and approximately 124,000 people
who used water from connected rivers. After 1951, radioactive
waste from "Mayak" were accumulated in special
facilities and in a system of natural and constructed ponds
located in a sanitary-protective zone of the plant. The total
activity of radionuclides accumulated exceeds the Chernobyl
release. On 29 September 1957 approximately 7.4 · 1016
Bq of fission products were released into the atmosphere as a
result of waste storage facility explosion. 217 localities with
270,000 inhabitants in the Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and
Tyumen regions were contaminated with radionuclides. In
1967, one of the waste ponds "Mayak" was dried out, and
around 2.2 · 1013 Bq of radioactive dust was
dispersed by tornado-like wind. The radioactive trail covered 63
localities with 41,500 inhabitants.
Chernobyl Accident. In 1986 more than 1 · 1019
Bq of radioactive substances were released into environment from
the destroyed reactor at Chernobyl NPP. Approximately 55,100 km2
of territory of Russia (Bryansk - Tula - Orel regions) were
contaminated with long-lived radionuclides. Up to now
112,000 people from 247 localities live in so called zone of
rigid control (with the level of 137Cs contamination
> 0.6 MBq · m-2).
Polar Region. According to the information
available approximately 7.6 · 1014 Bq of liquid
radwaste and 8.5 · 1016 Bq of solid waste (including
16 nuclear reactors from submarines and an icebreaker
"Lenin," some of which contained unloaded fuel),
were dumped into the shallow waters of the Karsk Sea. A leakage
of liquid radioactive waste from a spent fuel storage
facility took place in the Motovsky Bay and Litza-fiord. About
130 atomic submarines with unloaded reactors are waiting for
dismalting and decontamination. Up to the present, only 12 atomic
submarines have been undergone the so called
"procedure" (separation of forward and stem parts
without core unloading).
Nuclear Explosions. In addition to the military
nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk and Novaja Zemlja experimental
ranges, 79 nuclear devices have been detonated for
"peaceful" purposes practically in all regions of
Russia. Some of these explosions are known as an accidental (e.g.
"Kraton-3", "Crystal", etc.), and the real
consequences of many other explosions still require special
investigation.
Radiological Situation in Megapolices. From
1979 until 1992, in Moscow and St. Petersburg alone, more
than 3000 -
radioactive anomalies with the maximum dose rate up to a few
Röntgen per hour (R · h-1) were detected.
Technologically Enhanced Radiation Background.
Simple analysis shows that in some cases, the dose rates caused
by the release of attendant natural radionuclides (primarily
radon and radium) from enterprises of conventional industries
such as oil and gas extraction, phosphate mining, etc. are
comparable with those in the territories contaminated in
consequence of nuclear activities. For example, at the Oil-Gas
Production Association "Stavropolneftegas" the dose
rates at collector pipes reach 3 mR · h-1, and the
level of radiation near bore-holes range from 0.24 to 0.6 mR · h-1.
In addition to the above enumerated cases of radioactive
contamination one could mention 7.0 · 1019 Bq of
radwaste accumulated at nuclear facilities of Minatom, recent
accident in Tomsk and Chazhma Bay, 6.7 · 1014 Bq of
radionuclides, dumped in the Far East seas, etc. To mitigate the
consequences of the past nuclear activities and to stabilized
radiological situation at whole enormous financial, material and
intellectual resources as well as the new thinking and fresh
methodological approaches are required. Now this is axiomatic[2].
If so, human resources became the key precondition for successful
implementation of environmental restoration programs.
Unfortunately, dramatic (3-6 times) staff reduction in
design, research, educational and industrial institutions over
the last five years, as a rule, took place at the expense of the
most young and vigorous employees. The trivial result is that
capabilities of institutions to implement "traditional"
projects as well as their potential for the development of
innovative approaches and technologies were reduced highly
noticeable. But the most critical consequence is the loss of
continuity of work and the mental contacts between generations.
Such breaking-off is especially actual in Russia because the
vital and moral reference-points of "kids of reforms"
are far from those of mature generation. Therefore, in order to
transfer technical knowledge and experience to the successors, to
draw them in practical activities, to preserve the weak thread of
interdependence and trust between the professionals and the rest
of population, and to provide, by this way, proper basis for
sustainable movement to radiologically safe environment, it is
necessary to understand the youth and try to find common
languages.
As a first step on this way it would be reasonably to
investigate situation in the students audience, considering that
this is a "critical group" of population 'in respect to
the level of general education, willingness for apprehension of
scientific information, prestige among inhabitants and their
potential influence on the public opinion. It is important also
that present students in the near future will be responsible for
implementation of environmental restoration programs and
sustainable development of the nation as well.
About 300 students from St. Petersburg Institute of
Technology (SPIT) and St. Petersburg Medical University (SPMU)
were approached with the questionnaire covering the following
topics: (1) the level of concerns about environmental problems as
a whole and about the Chernobyl consequences, in specific (ii)
attitude to nuclear power (as an indicator of radiophobia); (iii)
ranking of the risk factors; (iv) radiation-hygienic knowledge;
(v) sources of radiation protection information; (vi) potential
readiness of respondents to participate in decision-making
process and a number of other questions.
One of the questions to be answered was "Which kind
of power engineering would you prefer in the future?" The
obvious aim of this question was to understand the real influence
of the syndrome of "radiophobia" as heightened,
explicit but purely emotional non-acceptance of everything
related to nuclear and radiation activities [3]. 20,2% of
respondents gave a preference to nuclear power. It would be
interested to mention here that the coal, gas and oil (the main
real alternatives to uranium) received 0.7%, 4.1%, and 0.35% of
the votes, correspondingly. At the same time 47% (?!) supported
hydropower. In other words the audience actively voted against
the all known sources of harmful pollutants. However, the
nuclear power plants were not included in this list.
Analysis of responses on the question about the impacts
seriously affected human health, leads to the same conclusion.
Indeed, students-technologists did even not mention nuclear power
in the first ten of the most dangerous factors, and medical
students put it on the last but one place. True, one could notes
that the highest point is given to the radioactive substances in
environment, food and water. However, factorial analysis of the
matrix, consisting of twenty six lines with variables plus five
columns with the hazard rating (ranging from 1 = "Not at
all" to 5 = "Very much"), shows that radioactive
substances are included in a relative large group of the factors
together with chemical industry; chemical substances in
environment; food and water; nuclear power and nuclear industry,
air pollutions by from public transport; bad quality of drinking
water, and coal industry.
The mean value of the risk of antropogenic hazards was about 3.3. Mean values of responses regarding the "radioecological" risks were slightly higher (Fig. 1). So, the attitude of the students to the nuclear/radiation issues could be summarized in the following form "Radioactivity influences human health as much as another hazardous an antropogenic pollutants."
Figure 1. Mean values of responses regarding
"radioecological" risks: (a) students of radiation
specialties; (b) students-technologists of non-radiation profile,
(c) medical students.
One of the question asked the respondents whether they
would accept nuclear or radiation facility in their local
municipality with corresponding socioeconomic compensation. Twenty-five
of 130 students-technologists (19,2%) indicated that they would
accept a facility at that conditions. Medical students were more
restrained in their answers: only 10 from 158 (6%) accepted
socioeconomic compensation as a price for the dangerous
neighborhood.
However, it's unlikely that one can consider this rather cool
reaction as a manifestation of radiophobia, because:
(i) risk is in part biospherical threats of harm to people
and in part a product of culture and social experience. Neither
in the former USSR nor in present Russia socioeconomic
compensations were given for the potential or real health act
from industrial or any other enterprises (excluding, maybe,
tragic events in Chernobyl). In this context one could understand
technologists who are looking for future job, but 6% of medical
students supported nuclear facilities in their
"backyards" -- this is unexpectedly high result;
(ii) it is known that there is a big difference between
personal and general factors in nuclear attitude. A man
who perceives nuclear power as substantially useful for the
country as a whole very frequently doesn't accept any potential
radiological risk in his own municipality. Therefore 35 of 288
respondents, who said they would vote for nuclear facility in
immediate proximity to their homes, give no reasons for
conclusion about antinuclear hysteria in this audience.
Summing up the above described it is reasonably to conclude
that radioecological risk is, as a rule, perceived by the
students more heightenly than "conventional" one.
However this pronounced attention has no connection with the
syndrome of radiophobia. In this respect situation can be
assessed as rather quite and constructive. The same
conclusion have been done by the authors of study, carried out in
satellite city Energodar nearby Zaporozhskaja NPP (Ukraine). They
have found, that during the period from 1990 to 1992 the attitude
of inhabitants to NPP had become much more. calm and constructive
[4,5].
In the course of this study we obtained also a number of
other results required the thorough comprehension. We hope that
the present inquiry and further investigation may considerably
contribute in solving of an extremely important and particularly
pragmatic problem development of human resources for proper
management of social risk, caused by present disbalance between
the scope and time-frame of environmental restoration activities
and aging of professional society in Russia.
References