Preconditions and Patterns of Risk Management in Russia. Dr. Konstantin Feofanov, Assistant Professor, Chair of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogics, STANKIN Moscow State Technological University and President, IN-DEPTH Risk Research Group, Vostochnaya str. 2/5/71, RUS-109280 Moscow RUSSIA, telephone and fax (++7 095) 2758019, e-mail indepth@glasnet.ru; and Irina V. Feofanova, Researcher, IN-DEPTH Risk Research Group
The paper is based on several research projects undertaken by IN-DEPTH Risk Research Group using statistical and documents analyses, interviews with experts and laymen, and representative surveys on regional and all-Russian samples. It attempts to answer the double question, “What are the social and cultural preconditions and dominant patterns of risk management in Russia?” For this purpose, the evolution of traditions, values and stereotypes during the years of the changes in Russia is discussed. The planned technological and management improvements are aggravated by permanent political and economic crises, hampering and reducing safety budgets. The unsatisfactory state property privatization policy, which has been the key aggravating factor of the last seven years, is emphasized as the source of serious problems of risk management at potentially dangerous production, storage, recycling and transportation companies.
As a consequence of fundamental preconditions, several dominant patterns of risk management were found. They differ considerably for different companies and industry branches conventionally characterized as “serious” or “ordinary” for viable systems of technological monitoring and public and experts participation, “nationalized” or “private” for property and type of management, “megalopolis” or “provincial” for regionally and socio-culturally biased values, “transparent” or “non-transparent” for style of risk management and communication procedures, and “supported” or “not supported” as regards support from local authorities.
The combination of opposite patterns is scrutinized as a part of the complex profiles of “advanced” and “backward” companies with peculiar deficiencies or advances in accuracy and transparency, terms of safety, attention to (or disregard of) environment or profits, orientation to (or disregard of) experts or public, degree of rational approach, “flexibility”, pluralism, etc. Possible ways of risk management improvements for both “advanced” and “backward” companies are suggested in the paper.
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