Decision-Analytic Refinements of the Precautionary Principle. J. D. Graham, Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115 USA, jgraham@hsph.harvard.edu
In public decision making about uncertain technological hazards, the precautionary principle calls for prompt protective action rather than delay of protections until scientific uncertainty is resolved. The precautionary principle has a sound basis in decision theory, particularly in situations where the potential hazards are serious and the costs of protective actions are tolerable. This article suggests that the precautionary principle should be refined to address three complications: (1) situations where the exposures to be reduced or prevented may have beneficial as well as hazardous consequences; (2) situations where the protective action itself will create potential hazards; and (3) situations where targeted research investments, coupled with delay of protective action, are likely to support wiser public decisions than prompt protective action. Each of these complications is shown to be relevant to contemporary policy debates about application of the precautionary principle. The usefulness of the precautionary principle in public decision making will be enhanced if these decision-analytic refinements are adopted in formal definitions of the principle.
The author greatly acknowledges helpful comments provided by TJ Carrothers, John Evans, James Hammitt, and Ragnar Lofstedt. This paper is in press at the Journal of Risk Research, a journal sponsored by the European chapter of the Society for Risk Analysis. The paper will also be presented on February 19 in Washington, DC at the annual meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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