Social and Technological Risk Tradeoffs Associated With Infrastructure Failures in Extreme Events. R. Zimmerman, New York University/ICIS
Transportation, energy, communication, and environmental protection infrastructure failures during extreme events seem to be occurring with more severe consequences. These failures often directly threaten the health, safety and well-being of people who rely upon such services and also indirectly affect people when the movement of vital supplies during and immediately after such emergencies is disrupted. First, the risks associated with alternatives for the design and management of these infrastructure services are explored with particular reference to site-specific and regional infrastructure associated with the World TradeCenter site following the September 11th attacks. Alternative configurations for key life-sustaining public services evaluated include: underground vs. surface locations for distribution and storage facilities; centralized vs. distributed systems for production and distribution; and physically and functionally interdependent, interoperable vs. independent, structurally simple system configurations. Second, these system alternatives are intimately linked to how cities have traditionally grown and drawn resources. For example, the length of transmission lines for water, fuel, electricity from centralized production centers has increased to provide essential services for urban regions. This increases maintenance needs and can pose security risks by increasing points of intervention and disruption during natural hazards, accidents, and terrorist attacks. In light of these considerations, consistencies, inconsistencies and tradeoffs between security and more traditional approaches to the design of infrastructure for urban regions are evaluated.
This work is supported by the Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems (ICIS) at NYU under grants9728805 and 0204660 (PI: R. Zimmerman) from the National Science Foundation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
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