The importance of peer review in regulatory decision-making
has been highlighted recently by the prominence of requirements
for peer review in several regulatory-reform bills before
Congress. Earlier versions of those bills included prescriptive
instructions regarding the nature and duties of peer-review
panels. Later versions of the bills have been less prescriptive.
Peer review is an important and effective mechanism for
evaluating the accuracy or validity of technical data,
observations, and interpretations, and the scientific and
economic aspects of policy recommendations and regulatory
decisions.
FINDING 5.5: Peer-review activities in
federal regulatory agencies are generally devoted to evaluating
the quality of the science and the scientific interpretations
that underlie a regulatory decision. The quality and
interpretation of other technical information, especially that
related to economic analysis and the social sciences, are
generally ignored. Peer review has not been used to evaluate the
use of scientific and economic information in regulatory
decisions, however, and there are no procedures for evaluating
the effectiveness of peer review itself. Several agencies do not
have official guidelines or policies for peer review. Of course,
peer review can be overdone; implementing a peer-review process
for every regulatory decision or every step in a regulatory
decision would lead to substantial delay and require excessive
resources.
RECOMMENDATION: The role of peer review
should be expanded to consider not only the quality of technical
information, but the use of that information in regulatory
decision-making. Peer review of economic and social science
information should have as high a priority as peer review of
health, ecologic, and engineering information. Clear, written
guidelines for peer review should be established by regulatory
agencies, and the effectiveness of agency peer-review programs
should be evaluated regularly. The level of peer review should be
commensurate with the level of scientific or economic importance
and regulatory impact of the decision to be made. Peer review
should be conducted not simply to seek legitimacy for agency
decisions and positions, but to improve their quality. When peer
review is judged to be unnecessary, an agency should provide an
explanation and justification.
RATIONALE
Peer review provides independent views of an issue. When used
well, peer review can serve as a system of checks and balances
for the regulatory process. In the context of risk analysis, an
open process for peer review can increase the credibility of and
confidence in an assessment. Peer review can make important
contributions to a collaborative decision-making process that
involves stakeholders. Administrative details--such as how peer
reviewers are selected, which agency products, regulatory
options, or decisions will be subject to peer review, whether and
how consistency among an agency's programs should be improved,
and how the outcomes of peer review will be used--should be
addressed by an agency's peer-review policies. EPA's
program-specific standard operating procedures for peer review
called for by its peer-review policy (EPA 1994) are examples of
useful guidelines for peer review. Peer review of the output of
the risk-assessment and options stages in the Commission's
risk-management framework (section 2) is essential for all major
rules under development. In some cases, peer review might be
useful in the problem-formulation stage.
Good science can be used to justify bad regulations. Asking
whether relevant scientific or economic information was cited
appropriately in a particular regulatory process is critical.
There appear to be no mechanisms in place that support peer
review of the use of technical information at the policy stage.
Perhaps scientific advisers to the EPA administrator, the FDA
commissioner, or the OSHA administrator fill that role
informally. Most peer reviews evaluate highly focused, technical
topics because of the assumption that scientists and economists
tend to lack an understanding of the history and philosophy of an
agency's decision-making process. A mechanism for evaluating the
descriptions and uses of scientific and economic analysis in the
decision-making stage should be sought. The Commission does not
suggest that the regulatory decision itself should be
peer-reviewed, which, of course, is the purview of the judiciary.
Agency peer-review policies should include a regular
evaluation process in which specific examples of an agency's use
of peer review in its regulatory decision-making are examined.
That evaluation would ask questions about how a peer review was
conducted, whether and how the outcome of a peer review was used
in a regulatory decision, whether the peer review was considered
useful, and finally, how the process could be improved. A good
example of agencywide evaluations of the role of peer review is
described in the EPA publication Safeguarding the Future:
Credible Science, Credible Decisions (EPA 1992b).
Evaluations could be organized by the agency, such as EPA through
its Science Advisory Board, or across agencies, such as by the
Office of Science and Technology Policy or the risk-assessment
subcommittee of the administration's Committee on Environment and
Natural Resources.
Potential peer reviewers with clear conflicts of financial
interest should be disqualified from service on peer-review
panels that could directly influence regulatory decisions related
to the products or interests of their organizations. However, it
is difficult, if not impossible and unwise, to eliminate bias,
which reflects views or positions taken that are largely
intellectually motivated or that arise from a person's close
identification or association with a particular point of view or
with the position or perspectives of a particular group. The
Commission believes that expertise, balance of biases, and
inclusion of active, younger, and culturally diverse scientists,
economists, and social scientists should be among the criteria
for constitution of peer review panels. Explicit criteria for
revealing and evaluating conflicts and biases are needed.
The person(s) responsible for selecting peer reviewers can
have a great deal of influence on the nature and biases of the
membership, the expertise represented, and, by extension, the
outcome of the review. Those persons can also have a lot of
influence on what is peer reviewed. That gatekeeper role should
be structured carefully to ensure that a small number of people
do not have undue influence on reviewers' characteristics or
decisions or on what is chosen for peer review.
Full peer review is unlikely to be needed for every regulatory
decision. The most-effective and most-efficient use of peer
review should be made case by case, taking into account such
issues as the extent to which the scientific information on which
a decision is to be based might be considered controversial, the
economic impact that a decision might have, and agency resource
constraints. Peer review should not be used as a device
to delay controversial policy decisions.