Enhancing the Role of Science in Stakeholder-Based
by
Gail Charnley, Ph.D.
4. Striking the Right Balance: Approaches to Solving the Problem
This section uses case examples to illustrate how different approaches to collaborative analysis have been used to overcome the problems of distorted analysis, credibility conflicts, and poor communication as stakeholders strive to give due consideration to both science and values. In each case, the disputing parties collaborated to generate a knowledge base that all stakeholders understood and trusted and that directly addressed their concerns.
Case #3: Prince William Sound. Following the dispute described in Case #1 (Section 2) between the oil industry and the residents of Valdez, Alaska over air quality, a second dispute took place (Busenberg 1999). The second dispute involved a debate over the capabilities of the tug vessels used to escort oil tankers in the Sound. The tug vessels’ primary purpose was to help correct course errors that might otherwise lead to collisions and oil spills. The RCAC (citizens’ group) proposed that the oil industry deploy highly maneuverable tractor tug vessels in one region of the Sound and an ocean rescue tug vessel with an enhanced propulsion system in another region of the Sound, on the basis that doing so would reduce the risk of oil spills. The oil industry opposed the proposal as an unnecessary expense given that existing studies did not demonstrate that those tug vessels would improve safety. The oil industry then proposed to resolve the dispute by performing a comprehensive risk assessment of the oil trade in the Sound. The risk assessment was to be jointly funded and managed through a steering committee comprising RCAC members, oil industry managers, and representatives of the two government regulatory agencies with the appropriate jurisdictions. To avoid “dueling scientists,” the steering committee combined the industry’s scientific experts with the RCAC’s scientific experts to form a single research team. Later interviews found all parties agreeing that if the oil industry had conducted the risk assessment on its own, no one else would have believed the results. By having the participants in the dispute structure and perform the risk assessment jointly, collaborative analysis was used to resolve potentially adversarial technical disagreements.
There were several benefits to using the collaborative model. One benefit was mutual learning among the participants. Frequent meetings led the steering committee to gain a better understanding of the technical dimensions of maritime risk assessment and the research team to better understand the problem at issue and to gather data it would not have otherwise. Steering committee members actually participated in data gathering with the research team. Another benefit resulted from combining resources, making more money available to conduct the work. The results of the risk assessment were accepted as credible by all parties involved in the issue, who agreed that hidden agendas or conspiracies could not influence the collaborative process.
In response to the results of the assessment, the oil industry deployed an ocean rescue tug vessel in the Sound. The risk assessment was not able to determine whether tractor tug vessels would improve the safety provided by the conventional tug vessels already active, however. The governor of Alaska decided the issue by declaring that tractor tug vessels constituted the “best available technology” as required under state law and the oil industry responded with two such vessels on the basis of the policy decision. Thus both science and politics played roles in the outcome.
Case #4: MTBE and HEI. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act established the Federal Reformulated Gasoline Program to make recommendations about reformulating gasoline in ways that reduce emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles. One of the ways the program has tried to reduce carbon monoxide emissions is through the addition of chemicals that increase the oxygen content of gasoline, or “oxygenates.” Methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) is an oxygenate that has caused some controversy because of disagreements about its effectiveness, its potential to cause human health effects, and its ability to contaminate ground and surface waters.
The introduction of reformulated gasoline containing MTBE had elicited a number of complaints from workers and the general public in some areas of the United States, including reports of unpleasant odor, headaches, burning of the eyes and throat, and other symptoms of discomfort. In response to those concerns, the Health Effects Institute (HEI) was asked by EPA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to convene an expert panel to review the available scientific information on MTBE and other oxygenates and assess potential risks to health resulting from their use. HEI is an independent, nonprofit corporation supported jointly by EPA and industry to “provide high-quality, impartial, and relevant science on the health effects of pollutants from motor vehicles and from other sources in the environment” (HEI 2000).
HEI convened a panel of scientists to evaluate oxygenates but recognized that the scientists did not represent the stakeholders. Appreciating that credibility in a broader context was needed, HEI identified an advisory board comprising stakeholders to work with the scientists and to help formulate the questions of concern. The advisory board members were representatives of environmental advocacy organizations, industry, state health departments, other government agencies, unions, other scientists, and citizens. The first meeting included both the scientific panel and the advisory board so that the initial problem formulation was conducted by both scientists and stakeholders. Together, scientists and stakeholders clarified the scope of the evaluation and identified and interpreted the needed scientific information. A draft report describing the study’s conduct and conclusions was reviewed by both groups. Although the substance of the draft and final reports did not differ significantly, both groups considered the review valuable because it improved the way in which the report’s message was communicated. The report concluded that risks from gasoline containing MTBE were essentially the same as risks from gasoline alone because any potential risks from MTBE were offset by its benefits (HEI 1996). Involving stakeholders in the process that was used to reach that conclusion added time and expense but, according to HEI president Daniel Greenbaum, the effort was considered worthwhile by EPA and HEI because credibility was maintained and stakeholders were satisfied with the outcome (D. Greenbaum, personal communication).
A second inquiry into the impacts of oxygenates in gasoline benefitted from the lessons learned during the first review. The first review had flagged ground water contamination by MTBE as a potential issue of concern deserving further study. The second review was able to focus on that issue, putting the potential health risks issue aside. The second review was conducted by a “blue ribbon panel” convened by EPA and comprising representatives of all stakeholders (US EPA 1996). The challenge for that panel was separating the credible science from the science influenced by stakeholder interests. Because the panel was an effective blend of stakeholders and technically competent non-stakeholders, the technical people were able to keep the stakeholders honest, thereby maintaining the credibility of the process and its outcome. The panel concluded that while current levels of MTBE in ground water pose no health risk, they recommended dramatically curtailing its use due to potentially widespread water pollution problems.3
Thus both reviews of oxygenates in gasoline demonstrated the effectiveness of combining scientists and stakeholders in a manner that was able to maintain the integrity of the science while addressing stakeholder concerns and assuring stakeholder “buy-in.” The scope of the second review was guided by the outcome of the first, demonstrating how an iterative approach to problem definition can help focus stakeholder efforts.
Case #5: Savannah River and CRESP. The Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) began operation in 1995 in response to a conclusion by a National Academy of Sciences committee (NRC/NAS 1994):
The Environmental Management Office of DOE [US Department of Energy] needs an independent institutional mechanism to develop data and methodology to make risk a key part of its decision making.
CRESP’s mission is to improve the scientific and technical basis of DOE’s environmental management decisions, leading to protective and cost-effective cleanup of the nation’s nuclear weapons while enhancing stakeholder understanding of nuclear weapons production facility waste sites (CRESP 2000). CRESP is organized to provide both guidance to and peer review of the evolving effort to use risk-based methods and evaluations to shape cleanup decisions at DOE sites.
One of the site cleanups that has involved CRESP is underway at DOE’s Savannah River Site. The Savannah River Site was constructed during the early 1950s to produce the basic materials used in the fabrication of nuclear weapons, primarily tritium and plutonium-239. Today, the site both stores and is contaminated by high-level, low-level, and liquid radioactive wastes as well as by radioactive wastes, mixed with hazardous chemical wastes. Before CRESP was involved at Savannah River, DOE, EPA, and the states had performed different risk assessments, obtaining conflicting risk estimates due primarily to differences in assumptions about exposure to contaminants through fish consumption. When CRESP became involved, its researchers concluded that the many conflicting assumptions about fish consumption could be overcome by obtaining actual data to replace the assumptions, and proceeded to work with local residents to collect the data. Another risk assessment was performed, monitored closely by stakeholders, and a new risk estimate was obtained that was higher than previous estimates. Nonetheless, risks from the approximately 3-millirem radiation exposure occurring through contaminated fish were still considerably lower than risks from background radiation levels of 200-400 millirem. The new risk estimate appears to have been credible and accepted by the stakeholders who participated because it directly addressed their concerns and because they had been involved in both research planning and in its actual performance.
3EPA is currently exploring whether MTBE can be regulated,
and possibly banned, under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
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